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STATEMENT OF CASE 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Industrial Commission erred in approving a lump sum settlement agreement that 
did not comport to the mandatory requirements of Rule 18 of its Judicial Rules of Practice 
and Procedure Under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law? 
2. Whether he Industrial Commission erred by refusing to hold a hearing and summarily 
denying the motion to set aside the lump sum settlement? 
3. Whether Morris is entitled to an award of attorney fees? 
NATURE OF CASE 
This case represents the challenge to a lump sum settlement agreement (LSSA) approved 
by the Industrial Commission (Commission) without its possessing current information on the 
injured worker's current medical and employment status as required by Rule 18 (C) of the 
Industrial Commission's Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure (JRP&P). It also challenges 
the LSSA on the grounds of constructive fraud perpetrated upon the injured worker by his 
attorney and the illegality of the LSSA on its face and illegality of the approval of the LSSA by 
the Commission. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Morris's initial attorney, James P. Hannon (Attorney Hannon), filed a complaint with the 
Industrial Commission on November 13, 2007, seeking medical benefits, temporary total 
disability benefits, permanent partial impairment benefits, permanent partial disability benefit 
and vocational rehabilitation benefits. Augmented Record (AR) p. 13. Respondents employer 
and Liberty'S answer denied that any benefits were due Morris. AR p. 16. Morris terminated his 
relationship with Attorney Hannon who then, on March 6, 2008, filed a motion to withdraw. AR 
1. APPELLANT'S OPENING BRlEF 
p. 56. The motion was granted and Michael J. Walker appeared as counsel on behalf of Morris. 
AR p. 59, 6l. 
Walker filed a request for calendaring of a hearing on May 12, 2009. AR pp. 67-68. On 
June 1, 2009, the Industrial Commission Referee scheduled Morris's claim for a hearing for 
January 5, 2010. The issues to be heard were medical care, temporary total disability or 
temporary partial disability, permanent partial impairment, retraining, and disability in excess of 
impairment including permanent total disability pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine. AR p. 75. 
At the request of Liberty, with the agreement of Walker, on December 29, 2009, the 
Industrial Commission vacated the hearing on Morris's claim. AR p. 90. On January 5, 2010, 
the proposed lump sum settlement between Morris and his employer and Liberty was filed with 
the Industrial Commission. R. Vol. 2, p. 270. No hearing was held on the lump sum settlement 
proposal and it was approved by the Commission on January 19,2010. R. Vol. 2, p. 266. 
On July 11, 2011, Morris's undersigned counsel filed a Notice of Appearance with the 
Industrial Commission. R. Vol. 1, p. 1. In an attempt to reasonably resolve the manifest 
unfairness of the lump sum settlement agreement that provided that Morris would only receive 
the equivalent of $15.73 per week for the remainder of his reasonably expected lifetime, 
undersigned counsel filed a Motion asking the Commission to review the lump sum settlement 
agreement to correct the manifest injustice of the lifetime disability award, to order payment of 
temporary total disability benefits and medical care, and to review the attorney fees paid to 
Attorney Walker. R. Vol. 1, p. 3; R. Vol. 1, p. 85. This motion was supported by a memorandum 
and an affidavit Morris's father Harold Dean Morris. R. Vol. 1, p. 155. Because undersigned 
counsel, after meeting with Morris on several occasions, was concerned whether Morris was 
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legally competent to attest to an affidavit counsel filed an affidavit setting forth the facts as he 
understood them from Morris. R. Vol. 1, p. 160. 
Walker, while still an attorney of record for Morris, filed an affidavit disputing the facts 
set forth in the affidavits and implicitly objecting to Morris's motion. R. Vol. 1, 165. Liberty 
filed an objection to the motion and memorandum. R. Vol. 1, 178-180. A reply was filed on 
behalf of Morris along with a second affidavit of Morris's father. R. Vol. 1, p. 186-197. 
Undersigned counsel also filed a second affidavit. R. Vol. 2, p. 202. The Commission denied the 
motion to review the lump sum settlement. R. Vol. 2, p. 214. 
On December 2, 2011, Morris filed a Motion to set aside the lump sum settlement 
agreement and memorandum based upon the failure of the Commission to comply with Idaho 
Code § 72-508 and JRP&P Rule 18 (C). R. Vol. 2, p. 218, p. 220. Walker filed a response to the 
motion. He asserted that the Commission "was provided the relevant medical and vocational 
documentation prior to its review and approval of the LSSA" and that the "pending motion is 
nothing less than offensive, unprofessional, and frivolous." R. VoL 2, pp. 241-243. 
Employer/Liberty filed an objection to the motion accompanied by memorandum. R. Vol. 2, p. 
245, p. 248. It too asserted that Rule 18 (C) at been complied with and that the Commission 
"fully reviewed the necessary and required information required to be submitted with the Partial 
Lump Sum Agreement and based their final decision of PPI and PPD benefits on Claimant's 
complete record as provided pursuant to statute." It cited authority for this assertion the 
"Response of Michael J. Walker date December 5,2011." R. Vol. 2, p. 246. 
Morris filed a motion to be provided a copy of all documents presented to and considered 
by the Industrial Commission's Commissioners when they reviewed the proposed lump sum 
agreement so that the representations of Walker, and those of Liberty based on Walker's 
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representations, could be evaluated. R. Vol. 2, p. 254. The request was granted. The documents 
provided confirmed that the Commission was not provided current medical and employment 
status documentation. See R. Vol. 2, pp. 259-366; AR p. 9 ~~ c, d, and e. Morris filed a reply to 
the objections .0fWalker and Liberty to set aside the agreement. R. Vol. 2, p. 367. 
The Commission denied the motion to set aside the settlement. R. Vol. 2, p. 385. This 
appeal was timely filed on March 5, 2012. R. Vol. 2, p. 390. Morris filed an objection to the 
record and request for corrections and additions. AR p. 1. The Commission granted the motion 
for additional documents and filed them with this Court. AR p. 93. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Morris suffered serious injuries when he was struck in the head by a twenty-five (25) 
pound boulder hurtled from a piece of machinery. R. Vol. 1, p. 38, p. 45. Morris suffered 
whiplash, TMJ, post concussive syndrome, depression with anxiety, chronic neck pain and 
spasms, chronic headaches, nightmares, and dizziness. R. Vol. 2, p. 236. Morris's treating 
physician was Karen Stanek, M.D., Ph.D. 
On November 19, 2007, Morris's first attorney, James P. Hannon, filed a complaint with 
the Industrial Commission seeking medical benefits, temporary total disability, permanent partial 
impairment, permanent partial disability, and vocational rehabilitation. AR, p. 13. Respondent 
employer and surety's answer denied that any benefits were due Morris. AR, p. 16. In March 
2007, Hannon withdrew and Michael J. Walker appeared as his attorney. AR, p. 56-61. 
In July 2007, Dr. Daniel S. Hayes Ph.D., Licensed Psychologist, and John A. Wolffe, 
Ph.D., Licensed Psychologist, diagnosed Morris as suffering a cognitive disorder as a result of 
his industrial traumatic brain injury. R. Vol. 1, p. 44, p. 53. On April 22, 2008, Gerald Gardner, 
Ph.D., Licensed Psychologist, submitted his report to the Social Security Disability 
Deten;ninations Unit. He opined that Morris had a cognitive disorder due to his traumatic brain 
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injury effecting his ability to manage his own affairs. R. Vol. 1, p. 63. On November 11, 2009, 
Morris was awarded Social Security Disability Benefits. The Social Security Administration 
required that Morris have a 'Representative Payee' to pay the benefits to in order to ensure that 
the benefits are used properly. R: Vol. 1, p. 69. 
In December 2008, Morris was evaluated by physicians at the request of Liberty. The 
stated Morris had reached maximum medical improvement (MMI), could not return to his time 
of injury job, but he could return to work. Vol. 2, p. 328. Morris's temporary total disability 
benefits were terminated on December 1,2008. R. Vol. 2, p. 265. Liberty began paying Morris 
permanent partial impairment benefits at that time. Dr. Stanek disagreed with the surety's 
physicians' opinion and advised Walker that Morris had not reached MMI. R. Vol. 2, p. 297. On 
March 17, 2009, Walker provided Liberty with Dr. Stanek's report and instead of seeking a 
hearinghe suggested mediation. R. Vol. 2, p. 299. 
On May 12,2009, Walker requested a calendaring date for a hearing. AR, p. 67. Also in 
May 2009, at the direction of Liberty, Morris was evaluated to determine if he was a candidate 
for a work assistance program called 'Work-Star Program'. He was determined to not be a 
candidate. R. Vol. 2, p. 235. 
On June 1,2009, the Industrial Commission scheduled a hearing for January 5, 2010. In 
addition to the issues of medical care, temporary total disability and permanent partial 
impairment, the Commission identified the issues of retraining and total permanent disability 
pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine to be tried. AR, p. 75. 
On June 18, 2009, Walker wrote to Dr. Stanek and advised her that, based upon his 
experience, the 'Work-Star Program' evaluators routinely determine that injured workers are 
faking their injuries and are capable of working without restriction. R. Vol. 1, p. 103. Dr. Stanek 
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wrote to Liberty expressing her disappointment with the evaluation and that the issues she 
identified were not addressed by the evaluators. She succinctly complained that she had wanted 
Morris to be treated in a multidisciplinary program. R. Vol. 1, 208. On September 23, 2009, 
Walker wrote to Morris informing him that Dr. Stanek felt he was capable of working "in some 
capacity" but did not completely agree with the program evaluation. He told Morris that "I would 
not anticipate resolution [of the issues set for hearing] prior to hearing in this matter [on January 
5, 2010]. R. Vol. 1, p. 106. Also on September 23 rd Walker wrote to Liberty and sought 
authorization ofthe medical care prescribed by Dr. Stanek. R. Vol. 1, p.l 07. 
On October 7, 2009, Walker wrote to Morris and advised him that, after deducting his 
attorney fees from Morris's latest impairment payment, that he still owed $2,190.00 in attorney 
fees. He also advised Morris that he could only expect to receive two (2) more impairment 
payments. R. Vol. 1, p. 150. The impairment payments ended in December 2009. R. Vol. 1, p. 
158,13. 
On November 1, 2009, Morris was found entitled to Social Security Disability Benefits 
due to his inability to obtain employment. R. Vol. 1, p. 72. Social Security, however because of 
Dr. Gardner's evaluation, required that Morris's benefits be paid to a 'Representative Payee'. It 
determined that this was necessary, to protect him and to "ensure the benefits are used properly. 
R. Vol. 1, p. 73. Morris's father, Harold Dean Morris is his 'Representative Payee'. R. Vol. 1, p. 
157, ,9. 
On December 15, 2007, Dan W. Brownell, a vocational rehabilitation specialist retained 
by Walker on behalf of Morris, reported that in his opinion Morris had "incurred a significant 
loss of wages and loss of access to the competitive labor market estimated to be at 50-55% above 
his current listed PPD [permanent impairment]". R. Vo. 1, p. 115. Morris had been told by 
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Walker that Mr. Brownell was preparing a report, but he was never provided a copy of it. R. Vol. 
1, p. 163. On December 17, 2009, despite being told by Morris's father/ Social Security 
'Representative Payee' that with regard to financial matters Walker had to speak to him, Walker 
instead wrote to Liberty's attorney that Morris would accept $68,000.00 in new money based 
upon Dan Brownell's report documented 50-55% PPD (permanent partial disability] above and 
beyond the PPI (permanent impairment] paid to him. R. Vol. 1, p. 116; p. 15719.1 
Either the same day, or the next day the 18th, apparently by telephone Liberty responded 
to Walker with a counter-offer of $54,381.00 with medical benefits left open? Walker told 
Morris that this was a "very generous offer," that "he would not get any more money from them 
than tp.e amount of the settlement offer," and there was "a good chance that he would end up 
owing a lot of money to Dr. Stanek and Dan Brownell." R. Vol. 1, p. 162. On Friday, December 
18, 2009, Walker faxed Liberty and told it the offer was accepted. Walker also advised Liberty 
that Morris was in need of the settlement funds "as soon as possible" and to "expedite 
preparation." He also agreed that the hearing scheduled for January 5,2010, could be vacated. R. 
Vol. 1, p. 117. 
On Monday, the 21 St, Walker advanced Morris $1,000.00. R. Vol. 1, p. 119. The LSSA 
was probably signed on December 28, 2009, because that is the date that Walker signed the 
attorney fee compliance memorandum required by IDAPA 17.02.082. R. Vol. 2, p. 280. 
As part of the attorney fee compliance memorandum Walker advised the Commission 
that Morris "has been released to return to work without significant physical work restrictions" 
1 As discussed below, this was a factually and legally false analysis because Mr. Brownell only 
stated his opinion on wage and lahar market access loss which are only part of a disability 
determination. 
2No medical benefits have ever been subsequently paid. 
7. APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
and was "exploring vocational options and anticipates utilizing proceeds from the LSSA 
resolution to assist with retraining costs." R. Vol. 2, p. 280. 
The text of the LSSA, which did not contain current medical and employment status 
represented that: 
1. Morris's "injuries include, but are not limited to, closed head injury, including a 
cervical strain, chronic neck pain, anxiety, PTSD, depression, headaches, 
photophobia, vertigo, dizziness, chronic jaw pain, and TMJ." R. Vol. 2, p. 261. 
2. "Defendants agree to pay future medical expenses that are causally related to 
treatment of injuries arising out of the October 18,2006 injury." R. Vol. 2, p. 262.3 
3. From the total due $7,734.97 are to be deducted as past due child support due under a 
lien from the State of Idaho and $1,680.00 to Morris' initial attorney for work done 
on an attorney charging lien for services in regard to a Child Civil Support matter. R. 
Vol. 2, pp. 265-266 and 355-357. 
4. "The lump sum is compensation for permanent impairment and permanent lifetime 
disability attributable to the employer and surety and shall be prorated over the 
lifetime of the claimant. Claimant's life expectancy tables, and the lump sum paid by 
the employer and surety shall be treated as if paid at a weekly rate of $15.73 per 
week, commencing on the 15th day of January, 2010." R. Vol. 2, p. 266. 
5. The "Total to Claimant" is $31,623.03. R. Vol. 2, p. 265. 
On January 13, 2010, Walker was telephoned by a representative, probably the person 
who prepared the Benefits Analyst that the Commission refused to disclose or provide as a part 
of the record, requesting "additional information to support attorney fees." R. Vol. 2, p. 276; AR, 
p.9. As reflected by Walker's a letter he faxed to the Commission representative immediately 
after the telephone conversation, the conversation was apparently a heated one because Walker 
felt it necessary to apologize for his "tone of frustration" during the conversation in complaining 
about, "with all due respect, hyper-technical [approach of the Commission] toward Claimant's 
counsel in terms ofrequiring supporting documentation for fees." R. Vol. 2, p. 277. 
3 None have been paid despite ongoing treatment. 
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, On January 14,2011, Walker advanced Morris an additional $2,000.00 to tide him over 
until the settlement proceeds arrive "in order to help you out financially on a temporary basis" 
and informed him that he would "be deducting total advances of $3,000 from your net settlement 
proceeds." R. Vol. 1, p. 120. 
The Commission considered, and approved, the LSSA on January 19,2010. R. Vol. 2, p. 
271. At the time of its consideration the Commission did not have any documentation, in the text 
of the LSSA or otherwise, of Claimant's current medical status as required by JRP&P Rule 18 
(C). The closest in time medical report from Morris's treating physician that the Commission 
possessed was a report by Karen Stanek, M.D., Ph.D., dated March 12, 2009. R. Vol. pp. 346-
347. The closest insurance evaluation report the Commission possessed is dated May 20, 2009. 
R. Vol. 2, pp. 348-351. It did not have Dr. Stanek's report of January 15th, just four (4) days 
before the Commission's consideration of the LSSA, that documented that Morris still had 
"unresolved" medical conditions including whiplash, unresolved TMJ, post concussive 
syndrome, depression with anxiety, chronic neck' pain and spasms, chronic headaches, 
nightmares, and dizziness. required referral to the "SLRI Pain Clinic for comprehensive 
program to facilitate return to work." R. Vol. 2, p. 236. 
Also when the Commission considered the LSSA it did not have current information on 
Morris's "current employment status" as required by Rule 18 (C). The closest in time report of 
Morris's employment status was a December 15, 2009, report by employability specialist, Dan 
W. Brownell. It stated that Morris was determined eligible for Social Security Disability benefits, 
was eligible for vocational assistance from the Idaho Division of Rehabilitation, should be placed 
in a sheltered workshop with a job coach, and should undergo a work hardening program if he 
was to successfully return to work. R. Vol. 2, p. 303. 
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Mr. Brownell's report is in direct conflict with Walker's representations to the 
Commission, in his attorney fee memorandum, that Morris "has been released to return to work 
without significant physical work restrictions" and was "exploring vocational options and 
anticipates utilizing proceeds from the LSSA resolution to assist with retraining costs." R. Vol. 2, 
p. 280. Additionally the LSSA made no provision for any of the settlement funds to be directed 
to retraining. The most "current" employment status was the January 15th report of Dr. Stanek 
referring Morris to a pain clinic to enable him return to work. R. Vol. 2, p. 236. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
'The scope of the Court's review on appeal from decisions of the Industrial Commission 
is limited to questions oflaw. Madron v. Green Giant Co., 94 Idaho 747, 497 P.2d 1084 (1972); 
Idaho Const. Art. 5, § 9. The Court may set aside the commission's findings of fact only if the 
record is devoid of substantial competent evidence to support them. See Gradwohl v. J.R. 
Simplot Co., 96 Idaho 655, 531 P.2d 775 (1975). 
ARGUMENT 
a. The Industrial Commission erred in approving a lump sum settlement agreement that 
did not comport to the mandatory requirements of Rule 18 of its Judicial Rules of 
Practice and Procedure Under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law. 
As a creature oflegislative invention, the Industrial Commission (Commission) may only 
act pursuant to an enumerated power, whether it be directly statutory or based upon rules and 
regulations adopted by the Commission, under Idaho Code § 72-508. The Commission's 
authority to consider LSSA is set forth in its JRP&P Rule 18 and in particular 18 (C). An action 
taken by the Commission beyond the bounds of its statutory authority is arbitrary and capricious 
and manifests an abuse of its discretion.Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686,864 P.2d 132 (1993). 
10. APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
, The Idaho Legislature granted the Commission authority to promulgate and adopt 
reasonable rules and regulations involving judicial matters for effecting the purposes of the Idaho 
Workers' Compensation Law. "Rules and regulations as promulgated and adopted, if not 
inconsistent with the law, shall be binding in the administration of this law." Idaho Code § 72-
508. 
The Commission's rules governing judicial matters. These rules are set forth in its 
Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure Under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law. 
(Effective March 1,2008). The INTRODUCTION to these rules states: 
"By virtue of the authority vested in the Industrial Commission pursuant to Idaho Code 
§§ 72-508 and 72-707, the Industrial Commission of the State ofIdaho hereby adopts 
the following rules of procedure governing judicial matters under its jurisdiction as 
provided by the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law. These rules shall amend and 
supplement those rules previously adopted by the Commission." 
The Commission adopted a specific rule, Rule 18, with regard to Lump Sum Settlement 
Agreements (LSSA). In relevant part Rule 18 provides: 
"C. Requirements. 
To ensure the Commission has information on which a determination can be made, the 
Commission requires the parties to submit the following information and serve a copy on 
each of the parties: 
1. Text of the terms of settlement, which shall include: 
a. The parties' names, 
b. Industrial Commission claim number(s), 
c. Claimant's current medical and employment status, ... " 
There is no dispute that, despite the fact Idaho Code § 72-508 binds the Commission to 
follo\Y Rule 18 (C), the text of the LSSA submitted to the Commission in this matter did not 
comply with Rule 18 (C). The Commission's Order denying Morris's motion to set-aside the 
LSSA acknowledged that the text of the LSSA did not contain the required information and 
asserting its absence was not a "critical flaw. R. Vol. 2, p. 386. 
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The Commission did not address the fact that Idaho Code § 72-508 mandates that when 
the Commission adopts rules they are bound by them. Instead the Commission avoided the 
clearly mandatory wording of Rule 18 (C) and asserted that "the purpose of the requirements 
[Rule 18} are to ensure the Commission has information on which a determination can be 
made." R. VoL 2, p. 386. The Commission asserted that the failure of the text to provide it 
information on Morris's "current medical and employment status" was not a "critical flaw." The 
Commission asserted that it was appraised of the required current medical and employment facts 
with supplemental information supplied by the parties' attorneys. R. Vol. 2, p. 386. The 
Commission generically identified the supplemental medical reports it had as: 
"medical reports, rehabilitation reports, impairment ratings, and neurological reports. 
The Commission is well aware that Claimant suffered a head injury, that Claimant 
suffered impairment, and that Claimant suffered permanent disability. Additionally, 
the LSSA left medical benefits open for all future related treatment." R. Vol. 2, p. 386. 
The Commission did not identify exactly what current information on Morris's medical and 
employment status it possessed when it. considered the LSSA. In order to ascertain exactly what 
information the Commission had to review at the time of its consideration of the LSSA, a 
motion was filed on behalf of Morris seeking the Commission to provide a copy "of all 
documents that were presented to, and considered by, the Industrial Commission Commissioners 
in conjunction with their review of the lump sum settlement agreement in this matter." R. Vol. 2, 
pp. 251-255. When the Record on appeal was initially prepared by the Commission it was 
unclear what documents the Commission had to review at the time of its consideration of the 
LSSA. A motion was filed to augment the record and requesting the Commission identifying the 
exact documents in the Record on appeal that it had when it considered the LSSA. AR, p. 1-6. 
The Commission granted the motion to augment. Its Order stated: 
"d. The benefits file is presented to the Commissioners with the lump sum settlement for 
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their review. 
e. The benefits file is present in the record on pages 259-366, as it was attached to the 
Order dated December 21, 2011." AR, pp. 8-10.4 
Perusal of pages 259-366 reveals that the Commission did not have documentation of 
Claimant's current medical status when it considered and approved the LSSA. The closest in 
time medical report from Morris's treating physician that the Commission possessed was a report 
by Karen Stanek, M.D., Ph.D., dated March 12,2009. R. Vol. pp. 346-347. The closest insurance 
evaluation report the Commission possessed is dated May 20, 2009. R. Vol. 2, pp. 348-351. 
Workers' compensation benefits can be awarded only as provided in the Workers' Compensation 
Laws and the duly promulgated and adopted Rules. Sadiku v. AAtronics Incorporated, 142, 
Idaho 410,411, 128 P.3d 947,948 (2006). 
Attached to Morris's Motion to Set Aside the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement is 
Liberty'S synopsis that it submitted for review in an attempt to also close out Morris's open 
medicals and entitlement to temporary total disability benefits while receiving treatment. 5 The 
synopsis contains a description of the medical report of Dr. Stanek dated January 15,2010. R. 
Vol. 2, p. 236. It reveals that, just four (4) days prior to the Commission's consideration and 
approval of the LSSA, Morris had "unresolved" medical conditions including whiplash, 
4 The Commission's Order Granting Morris's Motion for Additional Documents did not provide 
all the documents. Its order stated: 
"A Benefits Analyst at the Commission also prepares a synopsis of the case which 
is presented to the Commissioners with the benefits file and the lump sum settlement 
agreement. " 
The Commission, however, refused to provide the "synopsis" stating that: 
"The synopsis of the case is privileged work product that is not subject to a public 
records request, and is not part of the benefits fi.1e." AR, p. 10. 
Additionally the first page identified, page 259, is a letter from undersigned counsel dated 
November 4,2011, almost two years after the LSSA was considered. 
5 Despite continuing to receive medical treatment, albeit unpaid for by Liberty, he has also not 
received any temporary total disability benefits. 
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unresolved TMJ, post concussive syndrome, depression with anxiety, chronic neck pain and 
spasms, chronic headaches, nightmares, and dizziness. R. Vol. 2, p. 236. 
With regard to Morris's current employment status, Dr. Stanek's January 15,2010, report 
synopsis states that Morris requires a referral to the "SIRl Pain Clinic for [a] comprehensive 
program to facilitate return to work." R. Vol. 2, p. 236. When the Commission considered the 
LSSA it had no information on Morris's "current employment status." The closest in time report 
of Morris's employment status was a December 15,2009, report by the employability specialist, 
Dan W. Brownell, that was retained by Walker. Mr. Brownell, made before Dr. Stanek's 
referral of Morris to a pain clinic so he could attempt return to work, should have been a red flag 
to the Commission, in and of itself, demanding compliance with Rule 18(C) requirement of 
information on Morris's current employment status. R. Vol. 2, pp. 300-303. Mr. Brownell's 
opinion a month before the Commission considered the LSSA was: 
1. Morris needs vocational assistance that has not been provided. 
2. Morris has been determined to be eligible for Social Security Disability Benefits. 
3. Morris's disability has made him eligible for assistance from the Idaho Division of 
Vocational Rehabilitation. 
4. Morris should be placed in a sheltered employment placement. 
5. Morris should be provided with ajob coach. 
- 6. Morris should undergo a work hardening program. 
7. Morris required vocational assistance, placement in a sheltered employment program, 
provided with ajob coach, and undergo a work hardening program ifhe was going 
to have a chance at successfully returning to work. R. Vol. 2, p. 303.6 
Simply put, the Commission was not provided, and did not require, any information on 
the current nature and scope of Morris's serious physical injuries, and it had no information on 
6 If the Commission reviewed and considered Mr. Brownell's report one would think that the 
Commission would have checked the LSSA to see whether any funds were allocated to pay for 
retraining. If it had done so, it would have seen that no funds were allocated for retraining. 
14. APPELLANT'S OPENING BRlEF 
his current employability, when it considered the LSSA. Idaho Code § 72-428 (6) provides in 
relevant part: 
"a permanently disabled employee who has been afforded vocational retraining under 
a rehabilitation program shall be rated for permanent impairment only until completion 
of the vocational retraining program at which time he shall be rated for disability ... " 
If Mr. Brownell's report had been thoroughly reviewed and considered by the Commission it 
would have known that Morris eligible for assistance from the Idaho Division of Vocational 
Rehabilitation. His eligibility for vocational training alone should have stopped the 
Commission's consideration of the LSSA until it obtained current employment status 
information and information from Morris. Under the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-428 (6) the 
Commission should have first confirmed that Morris was aware of his statutory rights under this 
statute and required Morris to state whether or not he was knowingly and voluntarily waving his 
rights'under it. See Archer v. Bonners Ferry Datsun, 117 Idaho 166, 172,786 P.2d 557, 563. 
(1990). If the Commission had investigated Morris's the status of an IDVR retraining program, 
or options, it would have discovered that on January 15, 2010, Dr. Stanek stated that Morris 
required pain clinic treatment in order to facilitate his return to work. R. VoL 2, p. 236. 
As recently as Williams v. Blue Cross ofIdaho, 151 Idaho 51, 260 P.3d 1186 (2011), this 
Court addressed the purpose of compensation under the Workers' Compensation Laws. 
Compensation awards are intended to keep an injured worker and the worker's family from 
becoming destitute because the breadwinner has been injured and cannot work. Id at. p. 1193. 
Prior to the Commission's approval of the LSSA, during the time that Morris was 
receiving temporary total disability benefits and permanent impairment benefits, Morris was not 
able to support his family or pay child support. Idaho Child Support Services had a lien on 
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Morris's claim. The LSSA's terms revealed that $7,734.97 of the net lump sum Morris was to 
receive was attached and had to be paid to Idaho Child Support Services. R. Vol. 2, p. 266. 
Similar to the situation in Williams, the Commission's Rule 18 (C) requires information 
to be set forth in the text of the LSSA detailing Morris's "current" medical and employment 
status. This required current medical and employment information was necessary for the 
Commission to legally proceed to consider whether the LSSA was appropriate and it obviously 
did not have this required information when it considered the LSSA. 
The required current medical and employment status information was critical to protect 
Morris from himselr.? As reflected by the LSSA, medical and vocational report, and the 
affidavits, Morris was desperate, he had significant cognitive deficits, he was over $7,000.00 in 
arrears in child support, he was borrowing money from Walker just to make it until he received 
funds, and he was unable to manage his own affairs. Morris needed the protection of the 
Commission from himself. The Commission failed Morris by not demanding current medical 
and employment status reports, so it could investigate the underlying facts and merits of Morris's 
claim, before considering approving the LSSA. Without the required current medical and 
employment status information the Commission could not, and did not, undertake the mandatory 
review required of it. Without this information there was no way that the Commission could 
determine whether Morris, who was surrendering a strong claim for lifetime disability benefits, 
for the paltry apportioned sum of $15.73 per week that he was to receive under the LSSA. R. 
Vol. 2, p. 266. "Awards and agreements under the Workmen's Compensation Act must conform 
7 The Social Security Administration, based upon the report of Gerald Gardner, Ph.D. Licensed 
Psychologist, required Morris to have a 'Representative Payee' "to ensure the [disability] 
benefits are used properly." R. Vol. 1, pp. 57-64; R. Vol. 1, p. 73. 
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to the compensation law." Hanson v. Independent School District 11, 57 Idaho 297,301,65 P.2d 
733 (1937). 
, As the Court stated in Wernecke v. S1. Maries Joint School District #401, 147 Idaho 277, 
207 P.3d 1008, 1016 (2009), it is the responsibility of the Commission "to ensure that those with 
truly compensable claims get full compensation." The investigation of the appropriateness of a 
LSSA for each injured worker is a statutory responsibility "that the Commission must 
scrupulously honor.,,8 Williams, supra.' at p. 1191. The seriousness of this responsibility when 
. considering an award of compensation supposedly representing a lifetime of permanent 
disability, cannot be overstated. The Commission failed Morris. 
There is no basis for the Commission's assertion that, as a matter of law, it was not a 
"critical flaw" for it to fail to insist that Rule 18(C) be complied with and for it to fail to require 
"current medical and employment status" information to be provided to it before it considered 
the LSSA. The Commission did not have all the information necessary to perform its 
responsibility to ensure that Morris was receiving full compensation for his injuries and 
disability. If it had demanded the current medical and employment information it would have 
been obvious to it that Morris could not be reasonably compensated by the sum of $15.73 per 
week for the remainder of his life expectancy. R. Vol. 2, p. 266. 
The Commission has no discretion to disregard statutory language of Idaho Code § 72-
508 that binds it to follow JRP&P Rule 18. In approving the LSSA the Commission acted 
8 It is not known, because the Commission refused to provide a copy of the report prepared by 
the Commission's Benefits Analyst for its use in considering the LSSA, whether the fact that 
Morris was receiving Social Security Disability Benefits. It the Commission was aware that 
under'the Social Security Disability guidelines Morris was totally disabled, it was arguably also 
the Commission's responsibility to consider the interests of the Social Security Administration 
under the Williams decision. 
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beyond the bounds of its statutory authority. The Commission erred by approving the LSSA 
when the agreement failed to contain, and the Commission did not have other information 
docurrienting, the requisite text language required before it can legally approve a LSSA under 
Idaho Code § 72-508 and Rule 18 (C). The Commission's review of the LSSA was conducted in 
an arbitrary and capricious manner and it abused its discretion in approving the LSSA. 
h. The Industrial Commission erred by refusing to hold a hearing and summarily denying 
the motion to set aside the lump sum settlement. 
A decision of the Commission, in the absence of fraud, is final and conclusive as to all 
matters adjudicated by the Commission upon filing the decision. In relevant part, Idaho Code § 
72-718 states: 
"A decision of the commission, in the absence of fraud, shall be final and conclusive as 
to all matters adjudicated by the commission upon filing the decision ... " 
A decision of the Commission approving a lump sum settlement agreement constitutes a final 
decision. Davidson v. H.H. Keirn Co., 110 Idaho 758, 718 P.2d 1196 (1986). 
Undersigned counsel met with and began to represent Morris on June 23, 2011. R. Vol. 1, 
152 ~ 2. It was readily obvious that Morris suffered from serious cognitive deficits from his 
traumatic brain injury suffered when he was struck in the head by a twenty-five (25) pound 
boulder hurtled from a piece of machinery. R. Vol. 1, p. 38, p. 45. It was also obvious to counsel 
after reviewing the medical records detailing Morris's medical and mental condition, especially 
those contemporaneous to the time that the LSSA was approved, that a permanent disability 
award which was equivalent $15.73 per week for Morris's life expectancy, was manifestly 
unjust. 
Given the manifestly obvious unjust award it was hoped that rather than engaging in a 
full frontal attack upon Walker, the surety Liberty Insurance Corp. (Liberty), and the Industrial 
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Commission, could be avoided if the LSSA and the Morris's medical and employment status was 
brought into the daylight for examination. On July 8, 2011, a Notice of Appearance, a "Motion 
to Review" the LSSA and to schedule a hearing on it and medical care and temporary total 
disability benefits, and a lengthy memorandum in support of the motion was filed on behalf of 
Morris. R. Vol. 1, pp. 1-150. The affidavit of Harold Dean Morris, Morris's father and Social 
Security Disability Benefits 'Representative Payee', was filed in support of the request for 
review. R. Vol. 1, p. 155-159. It stated, among other matters, that his son was not able to 
understand what was communicated to him or recall what was told to him, that Walker told him 
that Social Security's determination was not relevant and that he was Benjamin Morris's 
attorney, not his. He stated that his son could not understand the long term ramifications of the 
LSSA and that his son was in serious financial straits and under enormous stress at the time the 
LSSA was signed and approved.9 Undersigned counsel also filed an affidavit, setting out the 
facts as could best be gleaned from Morris when, based upon discussions with Morris, counsel 
could not aver that Morris was competent to sign his own affidavit. R. Vol. 1, pp. 151-164. 
Counsel's affidavit informed the Commission that while Morris may well be found to be 
competent to testify, it was best, under the circumstances, that the Commission make that 
determination at a hearing. R. Vol. 1, p. 152 ~ 5. It was hoped that everyone involved when 
advised of, or confronted with, the serious nature of Morris's accident caused injuries and his 
total inability to return to work, that the obviousness of the situation would direct everyone's 
actions toward an equitable resolution. The process and procedure under the Workers' 
Compensation Law are to be summary and simple as reasonably may, and as far as possible, in 
accordance with the rules of equity. Idaho Code § 72-708. The Workers' Compensation Law is 
9 This is consistent with Morris's repeatedly seeking advances from Walker. 
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to serve the humane purposes for which it was promulgated. Idaho Code § 72-201; Wernecke v. 
St. Maries Joint School District #401, 147 Idaho 277, 282, 207 P.3d 1008, 1013 (2009). The 
objective of the Law is to ensure that those truly compensable claims get full compensation so 
that an injured worker and his family would not become destitute because the breadwinner has 
been injured and cannot work. Id. p. 286; Williams v. Blue Cross ofIdaho, 151 Idaho 51, 58, 260 
PJd 1186, 1193 (2011). 
It was not unexpected that Liberty, who had 'skated' on clear liability to Morris for life 
time permanent total disability benefits, would put up a legal argument in an attempt to save 
'bargain'. However it was still hoped that even if Liberty did not acquiesce to the obvious 
unfairness of the agreement, that it would be open to discussion and that the Commission after 
being presented with the required information that it did not have when it approved the LSSA 
and after recognizing tnemcrtlIatUb-ad not complIea williTclaIlo Code § 72-)08 and its Rule 18, 
that it would exert its equitable authority and seek to correct the injustice. 
Surprisingly, a sword was immediately drawn by Walker, who was still also an attorney 
of record for Morris. Despite recognizing that he was still an attorney for Morris, eleven (11) 
days after he was mailed a copy of the motion seeking "a review" of the LSSA, he filed an 
aggressively challenging all asserted facts in all the affidavits. R. Vol. 1, pp. 166-176, p. 167 ~ 4. 
When Walker prepared his affidavit he apparently failed to appreciate the fact that undersigned 
counsel was not asserting personal knowledge of any facts but was setting forth his 
understanding of Morris's recollection of the facts and circumstances because it could not be 
averred that Morris was competent to testify by affidavit. R. Vol 1, p. 152, ~ ~ 5, 6. Walker's 
affidavit asserted, among other matters, that the undersigned's affidavit was not based upon 
fIrsthand knowledge and contained inaccurate statements. He stated that Morris's recollection 
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about attorney fees charged was false; that Morris's recollection of arguments with him was 
false; that it was not true that he was told that Harold Dean Morris that he was Morris's 
'Representative Payee'; that Mr. Brownell's report concluded that Morris sustained a 50-55% 
"permanent disability" inclusive of impairment. 10 Walker also asserted that Morris understood 
the pr,ocess and settlement discussions and that Morris's statements to the contrary were false; 
that Harold Dean Morris's statement that he could not meet with him were false; that Morris's 
statement that he told him the settlement offer was "overly generous" was false; that while he 
was aware Morris was determined eligible for SSD he should not have reasonably been required 
to be aware of it because he "was not provided" a copy of Gerald Gardner, Ph.D.'s report 
recommending a 'Representative Payee'; and that he never perceived, or was suspicious, that 
Morris was unable to understand or comprehend what he told him. R. Vol. 1, pp. 166-176. 
T~daysafterwaIker's affidaVIt was mailed, Liberty's response, as expected, 
addressed the law. It asserted; "If the proposed agreement had been "obviously unjust, unfair, or 
wrong" [citation deleted] ... the Commission would not have approved the partial lump sum 
agreement as submitted by the parties." R. Vol. 1, p. 182. Liberty also cited Walker's affidavit 
and asserted even though "Claimant continued to treat for his injuries" that "there has been no 
reason for the parties to deal with an issue of any additional TTD benefits." R. Vol. 1, pp. 180-
184. 11 
Despite Walker's and Liberty's objections and still with the hope that the Commission 
would exert some influence towards an equitable resolution and avoid further confrontation, 
10 This assertion was false because in fact Mr. Brownell's report clearly only addressed aspect 
wage loss and labor market loss. It did not address the other factors involved in a determination 
of "permanent disability" under Idaho Code §§ 72-425 and 430 (1). 
11 This, of course, is an inherent contradiction since the LSSA specifically provides for TTD 
benefits while Morris was undergoing medical treatment. R. Vol. 2, p. 266. 
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second affidavits of Harold Dean Morris and undersigned counsel along with a memorandum 
were submitted to the Commission .. R. Vol. 1, pp. 186-201; R. Vol. 2, pp. 202-212. 
The hope ended when the Commission, after three (3) months, denied the invitation to 
review the LSSA citing Idaho Code § 72-719(4). R. Vol. 2, pp. 214-216. 
On December 1,2011, Morris's Motion to Set Aside Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, 
incorporating what the information submitted with the Motion to Review, was filed. The grounds 
were the failure of the Commission to comply with Idaho Code § 72-508 and Rule 18 (C), and 
constructive fraud. R. Vol. 2, pp. 218-240. Morris requested, and expected, a hearing. R. Vol. 2, 
p.218. 
The first response again came from Walker on December 5th . Most surprisingly, given the 
"current" medical and employment (contained in Dr. Stanek's January 15, 2010 report) status 
information that was not provided to the Commission when it considered the LSSA on January 
19,2010, that was provided with Morris's Motion to Review, Walker asserted: 
"The Industrial Commission was provided the relevant medical and 
vocational documentation (including the vocational report by Dan 
Brownell), prior to its review and approval of the lump sum settlement 
in this matter." R. Vol. 2, p. 243. 
Liberty submitted its objection and memorandum on December 9th . R. Vol. 2, pp. 245-
249. Its objection cited Idaho Code §§ 72-718 and 719. It characterized the Motion to Set Aside 
as a motion for reconsideration which was not relevant. With regard to the constructive fraud 
allegation, Liberty merely argued that the Commission should deny the motion, after making 
appropriate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. Vol. 2, p. 249. 
After receiving the information from the Commission detailing exactly what information 
it had when it considered the LSSA, Morris's Reply memorandum was filed on January 3, 2012 
and pointed out that the information the Commission had was not current. R. Vol. 2, pp. 367-
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373. The Commission denied the motion, without hearing and without findings of fact, on 
February 7, 2012. With regard to the constructive fraud issue, the Commission held: 
1. There is no evidence before us on which we could legitimately rely 
to support a fmding of fraud even if the statements presented are 
assumed to be accurate. 
2. ''the only grounds sufficient to permit the Commission to set aside claimant's 
award would be allegations and proof of fraud on the part of employer's surety 
in procuring the agreement. Harmon v. Lute's Construction., Inc., 112 Idaho 
291,293-94, 732 P.2d 260,262-63. [The unclosed quotation and the 
underlining are the Commission's.] R. Vol. 2, p. 387. 
The Commission's holding that only fraud on the part of the employer's surety 
constitutes fraud under Idaho Code § 72-718 will be addressed first. 
1. Construction of the term 'fraud' in Idaho Code § 72-718 
The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over which the Court exercises 
free review. Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute. The statute 
should be considered as a whole, and words should be given their plain, usual and ordinary 
meanings. When the statutory language is unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute must be 
given effect, and the court need not consider rules of construction. The court gives effect to all 
the words and provisions of the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. 
(citations omitted) Wernecke, supra., 147 Idaho at 282, 207 P.3d at 1013. 
When interpreting the Workers' Compensation Law, the Court construes its provisions in 
favor of the employee in order to serve the humane purpose for which it was promulgated. 
(citations omitted) Wernecke, supra., 147 Idaho at 282, 207 P.3d at 1013. The humane purposes 
that this law seeks to serve leaves no room for a narrow technical construction. Haldiman v. 
American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 793 P.2d 187 (1990); Reese v. V-I Oil Company, 141 
Idaho 630, 633, 151 P.3d 721, 724 (2005). The Workers' Compensation Laws should receive a 
"a broad and liberal construction." In re Haynes, 95 Idaho 492, 496, 511 P.2d 309, 313 (1973). 
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The object of the Workers' Compensation Law is not to see how much money can be transferred 
to workers as a class; it is to ensure that those with truly compensable claims get full 
compensation. If there is doubt the solution is not to send the Claimant away half-compensated. 
See Wernecke, supra., 147 Idaho at 285, 207 P.3d at 1016. 
The Commission held that only fraud on the part of the employer/surety in procuring the 
agreement was sufficient fraud to set aside a decision. It held that Idaho Code § 72-718 only 
applied to employer/surety fraud. The Court has never construed 'fraud' so narrowly. In Zapantis 
v. Central Idaho Mining & Milling Company, 64 Idaho 498,503-504, 136 P.2d 154, (1943), both 
the Commission (Industrial Accident Board) and the Court considered active or constructive 
fraud on the part of physicians. 
Fraud by the surety is the most likely source of fraud in a LSSA, but it is not the only 
source. The clear wording of the statute does not limit the persons/entities that can defraud 
perpetrate fraud on an injured worker and cause him serious harm above and beyond his physical 
and mental injuries. The Commission quote, or even address, Idaho Code § 72-718 in its 
decision. Instead the Commission merely cited Harmon v. Lute's Const. Co. Inc., supra., as the 
authority for its limiting and narrow construction of the term "fraud" in the statute. Harmon only 
involved a claim of fraud perpetrated by the surety. Thus the question of fraud perpetrated by the 
surety was the only fraud addressed by the Court. Harmon did not hold that only fraud 
perpetrated by the surety is the fraud required in order for a LSSA to be set aside under Idaho 
Code § 72-718. 
Idaho Code § 72-718, in relevant part, provides: 
"A decision of the commission, in the absence of fraud, shall be fmal and 
conclusive as to all matters adjudicated by the commission upon filing 
the decision ... " 
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The clear words of the statute do not support the narrow construction imposed by the 
Commission. The decisions of this Court consistently hold that the Workers' Compensation 
Laws are not to be construed narrowly, and technically, and reject limiting construction of terms 
when the statute wording contains none. The Court's opinion in McNeal v. Panhandle Lumber 
Co., 34 Idaho 773, 788, 203 P. 1068 (1920), is particularly instructive on how to construct the 
meaning of a single, unlimited, term such as fraud. Analogizing the interpretation in McNeal, of 
the term "accident", provides guidance to the Court in its construction of this statute. Just as a 
narro'Y construction of the "accident" in McNeal was contrary to the Workers' Compensation 
Laws, so too a narrow construction of the term "fraud" as used in Idaho Code § 72-718 would 
largely defeat the purpose of the statute and the Workers' Compensation Laws. 
Compensation laws were rendered necessary by the fact that the beneficiaries of the 
legislation are not people of independent means or necessarily so well-educated that they can 
engage in narrow and technical dissection of statutory terms. Given the purpose of the Workers' 
Compensation Laws to ensure that injured workers with truly compensable claims get full 
compensation, it does not matter whose conduct led to Morris being defrauded. It does not matter 
who caused the fraud, or how the fraud occurred, because the end result is that Morris was left 
receiving a pittance of the compensation that he is rightfully due for his lifetime permanent 
disability suffered as a result of his industrial injuries. Simply, the effect on the injured worker is 
the same, regardless of the perpetrator. The Workers' Compensation Law is meant to protect 
injured workers. Placing such a limited and narrow construction on the term "fraud", as the 
Commission did, is not conducive to ensuring injured workers receive full compensation for their 
industrial injuries. N either is such a construction conducive to ensuring honesty and 
thoroughness on the part of attorneys representing injured workers. The only benefit that would 
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be conferred from such a narrow construction as used by the Commission would go to Liberty. 
Such a narrow construction would permit it to avoid the responsibility, a responsibility that it 
received financial consideration from the insured employer for its agreeing to bear it, of paying 
substantially greater compensation to Morris than it did under the LSSA. The Workers' 
Compensation Laws are to be liberally construed in favor of the injured workers, not in favor of 
the surety. The surety has the ability to charge a substantial premium for accepting the 
employer's obligation to an injured worker as its own and it has the ability to spread its 'losses' 
across numerous employers. The injured employee, on the other hand, has only one body with 
which to try and keep himself, and his family, from becoming destitute. 
There is no basis to construe the term "fraud" narrowly as the Commission did. 
2. The Commission erred by denying Morris a hearing. 
The procedure and process of the Industrial Commission must be as far as possible in 
accordance with the rules of equity. Idaho Code § 72-601. Due Process of law under the federal 
and state constitutions requires that one be heard before his rights are adjudged. This principle of 
equity is applicable in proceedings before administrative bodies such as the Industrial 
Commission. Duggan v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 92 Idaho 262,264,441 P.2d 172, 174 (1968); 
Article 1, Sec. 13 Idaho Constitution; 14th Amendment U.S. Constitution. A hearing is designed 
to afford the safeguard that the one who decides shall be bound in good conscience to take and 
weigh evidence and make determinations of fact based upon consideration of the evidence in the 
making of a decision. See Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 480, 56 S.Ct. 906, 80 L.Ed. 
1288 (1936). 
Commission proceedings do not require compliance with the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See Hattenburg v. Blanks, 98 Idaho 485, 567 P.2d 829 (1977). Morris infonned the 
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Commission that one of his asserted grounds fo~ setting aside the LSSA was constructive fraud 
perpetrated upon him by attorney Walker. The memorandums filed in support of the motion to 
set aside the LSSA outlined the elements of fraud and appraised the Commission of factual basis 
for the allegations. The memorandums also provided the Commission with precedential authority 
holding that when there is a breach of a duty arising from a relationship of trust and confidence, 
such as the fiduciary duty between an attorney and a client, it is not required to prove knowledge 
of falsity or intent. R. Vol. 2, pp. 226-229; Gray v. Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc., 147 
Idaho 378,210 PJd 63, 71 (2009). The memorandum outlined applicable portions of affidavits 
previously filed that were applicable to the circumstances of the assertion of constructive fraud. 
R. Vol. 2, pp. 227-228; Vol. 1, pp. 155-164, pp. 197-200; R. Vol. 2, pp. 202-212. Additionally 
Rule 3, of the Commission's Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure Under the Idaho Workers' 
Compensation Law, in relevant part provides: 
"The signature of any party to an action, or the party's attorney, shall constitute a 
certification that said party, or the party's attorney, has read the pleading, motion, 
or other paper; that to the best of his or her knowledge, information and belief 
after reasonable inquiry there are sufficient grounds to support it; and that it is not 
submitted for delay or any other improper purpose." 
Morris's Motion to Set Aside the LSSA requested a hearing. It was not intended to be, nor was it 
thought it would be taken to be, a full presentation of all the evidence and testimony at hearing. 
No discovery or depositions had even been permitted or taken. The Commission was also 
advised that it would be necessary for the Commission to evaluate whether Morris was 
. competent to testify because undersigned counsel could not swear to that fact and as a result had 
to sub,mit information from Morris, designated as such, in his affidavits. R. Vol. 1, pp. 161-163; 
R. Vol. 2, pp. 204, p. 208-212. 
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The Commission's Order Denying the Motion to Set Aside the LSSA confinned that it 
was made aware of the constructive fraud issue to be resolved. R. Vol. 2, p. 387. The 
Commission, despite the mandate of Rule 3 regarding knowledge, infonnation, and belief after 
reasonable inquiry that there are sufficient grounds to support the assertions presented to it, held 
that there had to be a professional pronouncement of Claimant's alleged incapacity before it 
would grant Morris a hearing. R. Vol. 2, p. 387. The Commission in so holding, without 
referencing them, had to disregard the medical records before it that reflect: (l) Dr. Hayes opined 
that Morris "is cognitively impaired" and "unable to function independently" and diagnosed 
Morris as having a "Cognitive Disorder as a result of traumatic brain injury." R. Vol. 1, p. 44; (2) 
Dr. Wolfe diagnosed Morris has having a "Cognitive disorder as a result of traumatic brain 
injury." R. Vol. 1, p. 53; (3) Dr. Gardner diagnosed Morris has a "Cognitive disorder associated 
with general medical condition (traumatic brain injury)". R. Vol. 1, p. 63; (4) Morris was unable 
to even set up a bank account. R. Vol. 1, p. 114.; and (5) Dr. Smith reported that Morris is unable 
to remember when his medical appointments are scheduled without the assistance of a PSR 
worker and has "increased tangential thoughts and speech." R. Vol. 1., p. 148. 
Considerations of whether a person is weak minded or unable to handle his affairs at the 
time of the transaction are highly relevant in detennining whether the deficient person was 
subjected to overreaching or fraud. Cundick v. lR. Broadbent, 383 F.2d 157 (loth Cir. 1967). 
However, without affording Morris a hearing to fully address what occurred and how, why, and 
under what circumstances he signed the LSSA, the Commission held that "there is no evidence 
before us on which we could legitimately rely to support a finding of fraud." R. Vol. 2, p. 387. 
Without receiving and considering the evidence and testimony that is necessary for a full 
vetting of the serious allegation of constructive fraud, the Commission held that even if it 
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assumed that the statements of undersigned counsel were accurate, the "advice" given by Walker 
"are statements of opinion" based on a wide spectrum of evidence and Walker's professional 
experience. R. Vol. 2, p. 387. Whether a statement was intended as a mere expression of opinion 
or an affirmation of fact is a question of fact. Jordan v. Hunter, 124 Idaho 899, 865 P.2d 990 
(Idaho App. 1993); Fox v. Cosgriff, 66 Idaho 371, 159 P.2d 244 (1945). If the relationship 
between Morris and Walker was not a fiduciary relationship, it is a question of fact whether it 
was an opinion or an affirmation of fact. 
Certainly, Walker's telling Morris that he would not get any more money from Liberty, 
that the loss of wages and loss of access to the competitive labor market estimated by Mr. 
Brownell was the total extent of the permanent disability evaluation, and that the settlement offer 
was all that he was entitled to receive, would constitute fraud even without a fiduciary 
relationship. R. Vol. 1, p. 162 ~ g. Wage and labor market access loss are only two of the factors 
used to evaluate permanent disability. Also included in the permanent disability statutory 
determination are a person's age and all the personal and economic circumstances of the person. 
Idaho Code §§ 72-425 and 430(1). Walker's advising the Commission that Mr. Brownell 
determined Morris's PPD (permanent partial disability) and attached a copy of Brownell's report 
that stated he estimated Morris's wage and labor market access to be 50-55% was also a false 
statement of fact. This too constitutes fraud. 
The Morris and Walker attorney-client relationship was a fiduciary relationship. Mitchell 
v. Barendregt, 120 Idaho 837, 844, 820 P.2d 707, 714 (Idaho App. 1991). Regardless, the 
Commission failed to recognize that where a fiduciary relationship exists the one trusted, the 
attorney, is under an obligation to be truthful and accurate even if a statement(s) is determined to 
be a matter of opinion. Jordan, supra., 124 Idaho at p. 907, 865 P.2d at 998. 
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The Commission was provided with documentation by Morris that, 
1. On June 18, 2009, Walker advised Morris's treating physician, Dr. Stanek, that the 
medical opinion obtained by the surety was without credibility. "It is routinely the 
result of their assessments that the injured workers are faking their injuries 
and are capable of working without restriction. I am in receipt of the reports from 
Work Starr (sic) program in this case, and it appears Mr. Morris' case is no 
exception." R. Vol. 1, p. 103; and 
2. On December 15, 2009, Walker's retained vocational specialist reported to him that 
Morris was receiving Social Security Disability Benefits, was eligible for vocational 
services from the Idaho Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, required a non-
stressful sheltered work environment, a job coach, and a work hardening program. R. 
Vol. 1, p. 113, 
Nonetheless the Commission disregarded the inherent conflict between these facts and Walker's 
factual representation to the Commission that: 
"The claimant has been released to return to work without significant physical work 
work restrictions. He is exploring vocational options and anticipates utilizing 
proceeds from the LSS resolution to assist with retraining costs. R. Vol. 2, p. 379. 
The report of Dr. Stanek, just four (4) days before the Commission's approval of the LSSA, that 
Morris needed treatment in a pain clinic and vocational rehabilitation revealed the falsity of the 
facts represented to the Commission by Walker. Additionally, the LSSA made no provision for 
an allocation of funds for retraining. Ifhe needed retraining, it should have been provided for and 
funds )1eeded to be designated for that purpose in the LSSA. The Commission could not declare 
as a matter of law, without a full hearing, that Walker did not perpetrate constructive fraud on 
Morris. Additionally given Dr. Stanek's report, it is doubtful that Walker mentioned to Morris 
that he had informed the Commission that he had no work restrictions. The irreconcilable 
conflict should have been obvious to, and considered by, the Commission. A minimal 
investigation by the Commission would have revealed that that Morris would not agree with 
Walker's representations to the Commission. 
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The Commission's responsibility is "to ensure that those with truly compensable claims 
get full compensation," and to scrupulously investigate the appropriateness of a LSSA. See 
Wernecke, supra. at p. 1016; Williams, supra. at p. 1191. It has been held that a showing of 
gross inadequacy of consideration raises a presumption of constructive fraud and that where 
gross inadequacy of consideration and any fraudulent conduct are both present it is sufficient to 
set aside the transaction. See Johansen v. Looney, 31 Idaho 754, 176 P. 778 (1918). The 
Commission however ruled that there was "no need for a hearing on the matter." R. Vol. 2, p. 
388. The refusal to provide Morris hearing was inconsistent with its prior practice of holding 
hearings when questions of fraud were raised. See Harmon, supra.; Sadiku, supra. 
In Limprecht v. Bybee, 76 Idaho 293, 281 P.2d 1047 (1955), the Commission held a 
hearing when it was alleged that a LSSA was procured by fraud, even though no acts of fraud 
were alleged. 
When a claimant did not follow the peculiarities of the Commission's proceed, so long as 
whatever was filed clearly identified issues to be determined and requested a hearing, the Court 
has previously directed the Commission that claims for compensation should be decided on their 
merits. See Hattenburg v. Blanks, 98 Idaho 485,567 P.2d 829 (1977). 
After Hattenburg, in a case involving only whether a valid complaint had been timely 
filed the Commission proceeded with the hearing process and entered findings of fact, although 
based upon stipulated facts, because; "The Commission does not favor a case being decided 
upon grounds other than a full examination of the merits." Kopydolowski v. Doug Andrus 
Distributing, LLC and American Casualty Company of Reading Pennsylvania, lIC No. 2009-
008132, filed October 3,2011. (Appendix A) 
31. APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
3. The LSSA constitutes a contract governed by fundamental contract law 
principles. 
Where allegations and proof of fraud are present a lump sum contract can be set aside. 
See Harmon, supra., 112 Idaho at pp. 295-296, 732 P. 2d at 264-265. The illegality of a contract 
can be raised at any stage in litigation. Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6, 56 P.3d 765, 768 (2002). 
Whether a contract is illegal is a question of law for the court to determine from all the facts and 
circumstances of each case. Morrison v. Young, 136 Idaho 316, 318, 32 PJd 1116, 1118 (2001)~ 
Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 566, 944 P.2d 695, 701 (1997). An illegal contract is one that 
rests on illegal consideration consisting of any act or forbearance which is contrary to law or 
public policy. Quiring, 130 Idaho at 566, 944 P.2d at 701. The Idaho Court of Appeals has 
suggested that "where a statute intends to prohibit an act, it must be held that is violation is 
illegal, without regard to the reason of the inhibition ... or to the ignorance of the parties as to the 
prohibiting statute. This rule applies on the ground of public policy to every contract which is 
founded on a transaction prohibited by statute. Trees, 138 Idaho at p. 7-8, 56 P.3d at 768-769. 
Public policy may be found and set forth in the statutes, judicial decisions or the constitution. 
Quiring, 130 Idaho at p. 567,944 P.2d at 702. The submittal of the LSSA by counsel for Liberty 
and by Walker was illegal, as submitted, because it failed to comply with Rule 18 (C). The 
approval of the LSSA by the Commission, without demanding that the LSSA contain in its text 
the current information on the medical and employment status of Morris as required by Rule 18 
(C) was illegal. Idaho Code § 72-508 and JRP&P Rule 18 (C). A contract prohibited by law is 
illegal and hence unenforceable and it becomes the duty of a court to refuse to enforce it. 
Quiring, 130 Idaho at p. 566-567, 944 P.2d at 701-702. The LSSA, and its approval are void. 
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c. Morris is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. 
Morris is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-
804. On December 9, 2011, Liberty represented to the Commission: 
"The Industrial Commission fully reviewed the necessary and required information 
required to be submitted with the Partial Lump Sum Agreement and based their 
decision ... on Claimant's complete record as provided pursuant to statute." R. Vol. 
2, p. 246. 
Contrary to this representation, the is no question from the record on appeal that Liberty 
possessed the report of Karen Stanek, M.D., Ph.D., dated January 15,2010, no later than August 
10, 201 0; thirteen (13) months before it made this representation to the Commission. R. Vol. 1, 
pp. 126, 133. Had Liberty admitted to the Commission that it was not provided with Morris's 
current medical and employment status from Dr. Stanek as of the time of its consideration of the 
LSSA, it is probable that the Commission would have set aside the LSSA. Simply put, this 
appeal would not have been necessary. cf Curtis v. Shoshone County Sheriffs Office, 102 Idaho 
300,306,629 P.2d 696, 702 (1981). 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse the decision of the Industrial Commission and remand this case 
to the Commission. If the Court holds that the LSSA was considered by the Commission in 
violation of Idaho Code § 72-508 or JRP&P Rule 18 (C), or illegal, the Commission should be 
directed enter its Order setting it aside. If the Court holds that the Commission did not have to 
comply with the statute and Rule 18 but holds that Morris is entitled to a hearing on the issue of 
fraud, the Court should direct the Commission to hold a full and complete hearing on Morris's 
allegations. Attorney fees on appeal should be granted. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of September, 2012. 
Starr Kelso 
Attorney for Appellant Morris 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Opening Brief were mailed by regular U.S. 
Mail, with postage prepaid thereon, to the attorney for Respondent as follows: 
Kent W. Day 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 6358 
Boise, Idaho 83707-6358 
tfbd~rr-
Starr Kelso 
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76 Idaho 293 (Idaho 1955) 
281 P.2d 1047 
Agnes LlMPRECHT, Appellant, 
v. 
Milo BYBEE, d/b/a Boquet Cafe, Employer, and State Insurance Fund, Surety, Respondents. 
No. 8226. 
Supreme Court of Idaho. 
March 30, 1955 
[281 P.2d 1048] 
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Walter M. Oros, Boise, Paul C. Keeton, Lewiston, for appel/ant. 
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Robert E. Smylie, Atty. Gen., Glenn A. Coughlan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents. 
PORTER, Justice. 
On September 7, 1952, appellant sustained a back injury caused by an accident arising out of 
and in the course of her employment in the Bouquet Cafe in Mountain Home. On November 17, 
1952, she was discharged by her attending physician as surgically healed, and able to return to 
work as of that date with a permanent partial disability equivalent to 10% loss of one leg at the hip. 
Prior to November 17, 1952, the State Insurance Fund was paying appellant total temporary 
disability benefits. On that date appellant called at the office of the State Insurance Fund and 
advised Mr. George C. Moore, Chief Claims Examiner, that she desired to go to California. She 
asked either for an advance on her compensation as contended by appellant, or asked for a lump 
sum final settlement as contended by respondents. Mr. Moore prepared a regular compensation 
agreement on the usual printed form whereby appellant was to receive $700 compensation, $375 
of which had already been paid. The agreement provided the remaining $325 was to be paid to 
claimant in monthly installments. This agreement was signed by the parties. At the same time Mr. 
Moore prepared a letter addressed to the Industrial Accident Board wherein the appel/ant 
requested a lump sum settlement in the amount of $325 for the reason that she desired to go to 
the State of California. 
Mr. Moore and appellant then went before the Industrial Accident Board where the mentioned 
letter was signed. The Industrial Accident Board approved both the compensation agreement and 
the request for a lump sum settlement in the sum of $325. Thereupon such sum was paid to 
appellant by the respondent, State Insurance Fund. 
On June 24, 1954, appel/ant filed a petition for hearing with the Industrial Accident Board 
upon her claim for compensation. It is alleged in such petition for hearing that no valid legal 
agreement regarding compensation has been entered into and that the alleged compensation 
agreement made on November 17, 1952, was procured through fraud in law and in fact as against 
the rights of appellant. Respondents by answer denied 
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generally the petition for hearing and set up as an affirmative defense the lump sum final 
settlement. 
The matter was set down for hearing by the Industrial Accident Board and at such hearing 
evidence was offered by the respective parties. The Board made findings of fact and conclusions 
of law adverse to claimant and entered an order that the petition of claimant be dismissed and 
relief thereunder denied. From such order this appeal is being prosecuted. 
[281 P.2d 1049] Appellant contends the Board erred in finding and holding there was no fraud 
either in law or in fact in the making of the compensation agreement. Appellant did not plead any 
acts of-fraud. She testified that Mr. Moore, the Chief Claims Examiner, advised her on November 
17, 1952, that she could not receive any more compensation payments if she left the State of 
Idaho; and that Mr. Moore did not advise her that if she took a lump sum settlement she would be 
foreclosed from receiving any further compensation. These appear to be the only two matters 
upon which appellant predicates her claim of fraud. 
Mr. Moore testified that the advice he gave appellant was that if she left the State of Idaho she 
could not receive any more medical treatment at the expense of respondents. Appellant does not 
question the right of respondents to refuse to pay for medical treatment outside the state. 
Moore further testified that he explained fully to appellant that if she accepted a lump sum 
settlement she would forever foreclose her claim. In the letter signed by appellant requesting a 
lump sum settlement, we find the following language: 
'The provisions of 72-321, Idaho Code, relating to lump sum settlements have been read and 
explained to me by the State Insurance Fund, and I understand the meaning of my request for a 
lump sum settlement.' 
The Industrial Accident Board, upon substantial though conflicting evidence, found upon the 
factual issues in favor of respondents. Such findings are conclusive on this court on this appeal. 
Sectio~s 72-608 and 72-609, I.C.; Kaylor v. Callahan Zinc-Lead Co., 43 Idaho 477,253 P. 132; In 
re MacKenzie, 55 Idaho 663,46 P.2d 73; Idaho Mut. Ben. Ass'n v. Robison, 65 Idaho 793,154 
P.2d 156; Stralovich v. Sunshine Mining Co., 68 Idaho 524,201 P.2d 106; Miller v. State, 69 Idaho 
122,203 P.2d 1007; Johansen v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 69 Idaho 275,206 P.2d 545; Herman v. 
Coeur d'Alene Hardware & Foundry Co., 69 Idaho 423,208 P.2d 167; McGee v. Koontz, 70 Idaho 
507,223 P.2d 686; Adams v. Bitco, Inc., 72 Idaho 178, 238 P.2d 428; Kernaghan v. Sunshine 
Mining Co., 73 Idaho 106, 245 P.2d 806. 
The Board correctly concluded from its findings of fact that there was no fraud perfetrated 
either in law or in fact in the making of the compensation agreement or the lump sum settlement. 
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Zapantis v. Central Idaho M. & M. Co., 64 Idaho 498, 136 P.2d 154. 
Appellant contends that if it should be found there was no fraud in the making of the 
compensation agreement and the making of the lump sum settlement, nevertheless she is entitled 
to have her case reopened on the ground of a change of conditions under the proVisions of 
Section 72-607, I.e.; and that her petition for hearing should be construed as an application to 
reopen her case, made within four years from the date of the accident. Section 72-607, I.C., reads 
as follows: 
'On application made by any party within four years of the date of the accident causing the injury, 
on the ground of a change in conditions, the board may at any time, but not oftener than once in 
six months, review any agreement or award, and on such review may make an award ending, 
diminishing or increasing the compensation previously agreed upon or awarded, subject to the 
maximum and minimum provided in this act, and shall state its conclusions of fact and rulings of 
law, and immediately send to the parties a copy of the award, but this section shall not apply to a 
commutation of payments under section 72-321.' (Emphasis supplied.) 
The pertinent part of Section 72-321, I.C., is as follows: 
'Whenever the board determines that it is for the best interest of all parties, the liability of the 
employer for compensation may, on application to the board by any party interested, be 
discharged in whole or in part by the payment of one or more lump sums to be determined by or 
with the approval of the board.' 
The effect of these statutes is to make a lump sum settlement final and not subject [281 P.2d 
1050] to review within four years of the date of the accident. 
Appellant seeks to avoid the bar of the statutes by calling attention to the following language 
in the compensation agreement: 
'It is ull.derstood that this agreement is subject to the provisions of Section 72-607, Idaho Code, 
pertaining to the Modification of Awards and Agreements.' 
This is a printed provision in the blank form used for compensation agreements and is proper 
so far as such agreements are concerned. 
The compensation agreement herein fixed the amount of the award and the terms of its 
payment by installments. The proVisions of Section 72-607, I.C., providing for the reopening of the 
cause upon a change in conditions were applicable thereto. However, when the request for a lump 
sum payment was approved by the Industrial Accident Board and payment made thereunder the 
compensation agreement for installment payments was superseded. The 
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prOVision in Section 72-607, I.C., that such statute should not apply where there had been a lump 
sum settlement came into effect. 
The compensation agreement, when approved by the Industrial Accident Board, became in 
force and effect the same as an award by the Board. Rodius v. Coeur d'Alene Mill Co., 46 Idaho 
692, 271 P. 1; Dept. of Finance of State v. Union P. R. Co., 61 Idaho 484, 104 P.2d 1110; 
Zapantis v. Central Idaho Min. & Mill. Co., 61 Idaho 660, 106 P.2d 113; Blackburn v. Olson, 69 
Idaho 428,207 P.2d 1160; Nitkey v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Min. & Con. Co., 73 Idaho 294, 251 
P.2d 216. 
Section 72-608, I.C., is in part as follows: 
'An award of the board in the absence of fraud, shall be final and conclusive between the parties, 
except as provided in section 72-607, unless within 30 days after a copy has been sent to the 
parties, either party appeals to the Supreme Court.' 
A valid award having been made and no fraud having been found by the Board and no appeal 
having been taken within 30 days after a copy of the award was received by the parties, the award 
became and is final and conclusive between the parties. Rodius v. Coeur d'Alene Mill Co., supra; 
Reagan v. Baxter Foundry etc., Wks., 53 Idaho 722, 27 P.2d 62; Barry v. Peterson Motor Co., 55 
Idaho 702,46 P.2d 77; Zapantis v. Centra/Idaho Min. & Mill. Co., 61 Idaho 660, 106 P.2d 113; 
Blackburn v. Olson, supra. 
Appellant, in her specifications of error, urges that the Board erred in sustaining objections to 
certain questions. We have examined the evidence and questions to which objections were 
sustained and find no error in the rulings of the Board. 
The order of the Industrial Accident Board is affirmed. Costs to respondents. 
TAYLOR, C. J., ANDERSON and SMITH, JJ., and H. McQUADE, D. J., concur. 
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DOUG ANDRUS DISTRIBUTING, LLC, ) FINDINGS OF FACT, 
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Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned this matter 
to Referee Douglas A. Donohue. Keith Hutchinson represented Claimant. Alan Gardner 
represented Defendants. The parties submitted a stipulation of facts and attendant documents in 
lieu of hearing. The parties filed briefs. The case came under advisement on August 8, 2011. 
It is now ready for decision. 
ISSUES 
The issues to be resolved as agreed upon by the parties are: 
1. Whether Claimant's Complaint is valid; and 
2. Whether claimant's Complaint is barred by the statute oflimitations set 
forth in Idaho Code § 72-706(1). 
Other issues are reserved. 
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 
Claimant contends his Complaint should be deemed valid and timely filed within the 
statutes of limitation. He orally asked his brother to complete and sign the Complaint because 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSION OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 1 
Claimant was on the road in his job as a long-haul trucker. He had previously given his brother a 
written authorization to obtain medical records on his behalf. Claimant contends the ratified 
signature of his brother on filing the Complaint prevents the statute of limitation, Idaho Code 
§ 72-706, from running where Claimant was unavailable because of his job. 
Defendants contend the fact that neither Claimant nor a licensed attorney signed a timely 
Complaint is dispositive. 
EVIDENCE CONSIDERED 
The record in the instant case consists of the following: 
1. Stipulated facts and attendant documents submitted by the parties. 
The documents are: 
a) The original Complaint signed by Claimant's brother, Certificate 
of Service of Workers' Compensation Complaint, and Letter of 
Record; 
b) The Amended Comp laint signed by Claimant's brother; Certificate 
of Service of Amended Workers' Compensation Complaint, and 
Letter of Record; 
c) Excerpt of Claimant's deposition; 
d) Claimant's affidavit; 
e) A second Complaint signed by Claimant's attorney 
Keith Hutchinson; 
f) A second Amended Complaint signed by Keith Hutchinson; and 
2. The Industrial Commission legal file pertaining to this claim. 
Defendants do not concede the accuracy of statements made in Claimant's affidavit. 
After considering the record, the Referee submits the following findings of fact, 
conclusions oflaw, and recommendation for review by the Commission. 
STIPULATED FINDINGS OF FACT 
l. Claimant alleges he sustained an industrial accident on March 20,2009. 
2. On May 19, 2009, Claimant executed an authorization allowing his brother 
Anthony John Kopydlowski to obtain medical records pertaining to his "injury/illness." 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSION OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 2 
3. In late April or early May of 2009, after returning home from the hospital in 
Salt Lake, Mr. Kopydlowski retained services of an Idaho law firm [name redacted by Referee] 
in regards to this matter. 
4. On February 22, 2010, Mr. Kopydlowski received a letter from an attorney in 
that firm [name redacted by Referee] indicating that they were withdrawing from rep'resentation 
on this case. 
5. They had not filed a Complaint at that point; however, they did send 
Mr. Kopydlowski a copy of the Complaint to be filed. 
6. On March 2, 2010, the Commission served Doug Andrus Distributing LLC and 
American Casualty Company of Reading Pennsylvania a copy of the Complaint regarding 
Claimant's alleged March 20, 2009, industrial accident. The Complaint does not contain 
Claimant's signature. It is signed by Claimant's brother Anthony Kopydlowski and following 
his printed name it states: "Medical Power of Attorney for Andrew." Claimant was sent a copy 
of the Certificate of Service. 
7. On March 9,2010, the Commission served Doug Andrus Distributing LLC and 
American Casualty Company of Reading Pennsylvania a copy of the Amended Complaint in 
this matter. The Amended Complaint does not contain Claimant's signature. It is signed by 
Claimant's brother Anthony Kopydlowski and following his printed name it states: "Medical 
Power of Attorney for Andrew." Claimant was sent a copy of the Certificate of Service. 
8. On or about May 18, 2010, attorney Keith Hutchinson filed a Notice of 
Appearance in this matter on Claimant's behalf. 
9. Claimant's deposition took place on August 9, 2010. At that time, the following 
conversation took place: 
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issues: 
Q. You filed an original- here, I have a copy of it right here - original 
Complaint in this matter. And then I have a copy of the Amended 
Complaint. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Does this look familiar? 
A. No, it doesn't. 
Q. I wanted to clarify. This is what the Commission has on file. And so I 
just want to clarify. You crossed this out. 
A. You know, I had my sister-in-law fill those out. Because I was out on the 
trucks. And I honestly do not recall any of that. 
Q. So just to clarify whose signature that is. 
A. I don't have a clue. 
Q. Does it say underneath there? 
A. Anthony Kopydlowski. So, that would be my brother Tony. 
Q. So, as far as you know, was he the one that filled this out for you? 
MR. HUTCHINSON: If you know. 
THE WITNESS: r honestly couldn't say. 
(Deposition, pp. 6 at 16-25, 7 at 1-11). 
10. On August 11, 2010, Defendants filed a Motion to Bifurcate on the following 
a. Whether claimant's Complaint is valid; and 
b. Whether claimant's Complaint is barred by the statute of 
limitations set forth in Idaho Code § 72-706(1). 
II. On August 25, 20 I 0, Keith Hutchinson served Doug Andrus and Broadspire 
a copy of a Complaint regarding Claimant's alleged March 20, 2009, industrial accident. 
Mr. Hutchinson's signature is on the Complaint. 
12. On August 31, 2010, Keith Hutchinson served Doug Andrus and Intermountain 
Claims a copy of an Amended Complaint. Mr. Hutchinson's signature is on the Amended 
Complaint. 
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DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS OF FACT 
13. The foregoing stipulated findings of fact are accepted and adopted by 
the Commission. Also, although not enumerated among the stipulated facts, the arguments of 
the parties make it clear that this is a claim on which no workers' compensation benefits have 
been paid. Otherwise, the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-706(1) would not be at issue, and the 
discussion would instead center on the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-706(2). 
14. The Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho Code § 72-706(1) limits the time within 
which a claimant may file an application for hearing ("Complaint") to one year after making a 
claim for compensation. That section provides: 
72-706. Limitation on time on application for hearing. (1) When no 
compensation paid. When a claim for compensation has been made and no 
compensation has been paid thereon, the claimant, unless misled to his prejudice 
by the employer or surety, shall have one (1) year from the date of making claim 
within which to make and file with the commission an application requesting a 
hearing and an award under such claim. 
15. Therefore, where no workers' compensation benefits have been paid in a case, 
in order to determine whether a complaint is timely filed, it is not the date of accident that is 
relevant, but rather, the date of the making of the claim. Under Idaho Code § 72-701, Claimant 
has one year from the date of accident within which to make a timely claim. Under Idaho 
Code § 72-706(1), Claimant has one year from the date of making his claim within which to 
file his Complaint. Therefore, the Complaints filed by Mr. Hutchinson on Claimant's behalf are 
potentially timely, depending entirely on when Claimant actually made his claim for benefits. 
As with the question of whether benefits were paid on this claim, the stipulation is silent as to the 
date on which Claimant made his claim for benefits under Idaho Code § 72-701. However, the 
Commission's legal file, which is part of the record in this matter, reflects that on March 24, 
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2009, Employer was notified of the Claim and prepared a Notice of Injury and Claim for 
Benefits, later filed with the Commission on March 26,2009. 
16. Therefore, Claimant was required to file his complaint within one year following 
the date on which he made his claim with employer, i.e. March 24,2009. 
17. Industrial Commission Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure ("JRP") 
Rule 3(0) states: 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney 
shall be signed by at least one I icensed attorney of record of the State of Idaho, in 
the attorney's individual name. A party who is not represented by an attorney 
shall sign the pleading, motion, or other paper. The signature of any party to 
an action, or the party's attorney, shall constitute a certification that said party, or 
the party's attorney, has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best 
of his or her knowledge, information and belief after reasonable inquiry there 
are sufficient grounds to support it; and that it is not submitted for delay or any 
other improper purpose. 
18. The Commission acknowledges and treats with sober consideration the 
proposition that "sure and certain relief' is a purpose of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law, 
Idaho Code § 72-201, and that process and procedure should be "as summary and simple as 
reasonably may be and as far as possible in accordance with the rules of equity," Idaho Code 
§ 72-708; JRP Rule 1 (A). 
19. Claimant cites the case of Hattenburg v. Blanks, 98 Idaho 485, 567 P.2d 829 
(19'77). In Hattenburg, the claimant timely filed a form entitled "Application for Hearing." 
Defendants moved to dismiss and the Commission granted dismissal on the argument that 
this document was not a "claim" for compensation. The Court reversed and remanded. It noted 
the only statutory requirement for a "claim" was that it be in writing. It held the "Application 
for Hearing" included sufficient information to constitute a "claim." From it, Blanks, et.al. 
"realized that he was demanding compensation for his injury." Id., at 486. The Court stated: 
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"The whole idea is to get away from cumbersome procedures and technicalities of pleading so 
that, to the greatest extent possible, claims for compensation can be decided on their merits." Id. 
20. The facts in Claimant's circumstance do not address JRP Rule 3(A) which 
prescribes a form for a Complaint. Rather, Claimant's circumstance asks the Commission 
to deem a document not filed by him or a licensed attorney on his behalf to override the 
Legislative mandate of Idaho Code § 72-706. 
21. Claimant's reference to Hagler v. Micron, 118 Idaho 596, 798 P.2d 55 (1990) 
is apposite only for dicta about the Commission's relaxed rules of evidence. In Hagler, 
the Court affirmed the Commission's determination that claimant failed to prove causation 
with medical testimony. It called "harmless error" the Commission's refusal to allow a 
pro se claimant to admit a medical treatise into evidence without proper foundation. It noted 
standards should be relaxed as an accommodation to a pro se claimant. Hagler does not further a 
pOSition, arguendo, that a statute of limitation can be ignored or circumvented in the name 
of "relaxed standards." 
22. Like Hagler for Claimant, Defendants' citation to Aldrich v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 
122 Idaho 361, 834 P.2d 878 (1992), is not much help. In Aldrich, the Court stated, 
"the Commission is not required to construe facts liberally in favor of the worker when 
evidence is conflicting." Id., at 363 (Court affirmed Commission finding that claimant failed 
to establish condition was caused by exposure at work). Here, the focus is exactly upon 
how strictly to construe statutes and rules, not whether one set of facts is to be found 
over another. 
23. No case cited by the parties is squarely on point. The nearest is Black v. 
Am~ritelInns, Inc., 139 Idaho 511, 81 P.3d 416 (2003). In Black, an attorney licensed in 
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Washington but not in Idaho signed and filed a Complaint with the Idaho Commission on 
Human Rights ("ICHR"). After due procedural process through ICHR, District Court, the 
Court of Appeals, and the Idaho Supreme Court, the Idaho Supreme Court held: "pursuant to 
the signature requirements of IRCP Rule 11(a)(1), an agent cannot sign a Complaint for 
unrepresented parties. The Court distinguished between an inadvertent error and this instance 
where the Washington attorney signed the Complaint "so that it would be filed in time." 
It further held that a subsequent Amended Complaint could not relate back to the date of filing 
thdnvalidly-signed original Complaint. 
24. JRP Rule 3(D) is less restrictive than Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("IRCP") 
Rule 11(a)(J). It allows a more "summary and simple" requirement for signing. However, 
the Black Court in rejecting the attorney's signature because he was not licensed in Idaho, 
identified that the purpose of making the invalid signature was to avoid running afoul of a 
statute of limitation. This purpose was exactly why Claimant's brother signed the Complaint 
in Mr. Kopydlowski's claim. 
25. Here, Claimant's candor under oath in deposition demonstrated that he did not 
recall being aware that a Complaint had been filed on his behalf or who filed it. His recollection 
then - that he had asked his sister-in-law to file it - is inconsistent with his later affidavit that 
he had asked his brother to file it. 
26. Regardless of whom he asked to file the Complaint, since neither his brother nor 
his sister-in-law are attorneys licensed to practice in Idaho, the signature of either would be 
invalid under JRP Rule 3(D). To find otherwise would require the Commission to accept a 
Complaint signed by any third party on the chance that a claimant might have given oral 
authorization to that third party to file it. 
FTh1JINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSION OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 8 
27. In this technological era where the Commission accepts filings by facsimile 
machine (see, JRP Rule 3(A)(I)), Claimant's assertion that, because he was driving truck, 
he was "unavailable" to sign a Complaint between February 22 and March 20, 2010, is tenuous 
at best. 
28. The Commission does not favor a case being decided upon grounds other than 
a full examination of the merits. However, the Legislature has spoken with a specific statute 
of limitation, Idaho Code § 72-706, and the mere fact that Claimant was out of state on a job 
does not constitute an adequate basis to ignore the statute or the provisions of JRP Rule 3(D). 
Commission procedure allows remote filing by mail or by fax. 
29. Having found that the two Complaints filed on Claimant's behalf by his brother 
are not valid Complaints under Idaho Code § 72-706(1), and JRP Rule 3(D), it is next necessary 
to consider whether the two subsequent Complaints filed on Claimant's behalf by 
Mr. Hutchinson are timely. Based on our finding that Claimant's claim was made no later than 
March 24, 2009, Claimant was required to file his valid Complaint no later than one year 
following March 24, 2009. Both of the Complaints filed on Claimant's behalf by 
Mr. Hutchinson were filed in August 20 10. Therefore, under Idaho Code § 72-706(1), both of 
these Complaints are untimely. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The document filed March I, 20 10 ("Complaint") and/or the document filed 
March 8, 2010 ("Amended Complaint") signed by Claimant's brother do not constitute a valid 
Complaint; and 
2. The subsequent Complaints filed on Claimant's behalf by Mr. Hutchinson are 
untimely pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-706(1). 
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RECOMMENDATION 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation, 
the Referee recommends that the Commission adopt such findings and conclusions as its own 
and issue an appropriate final order. 
DATED this 14TH day of SEPTEMBER, 2011. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Douglas A. Donohue, Referee 
ATIEST: 
/S/ ______________________ __ 
Assistant Commission Secretary db 
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